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accurate understanding of the Court in the United States, and challenging an
assertion often used by opponents of the ICC against my organization's advocacy for
it.
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Response
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
by Jens David Ohlin
In his learned commentary, John W ashburn argues that I have misread the Rome
Statute and the discretion it affords the ICC prosecutor in cases referred to the Court
from the Security Council. However, I maintain my position that the ICC prosecutor
has no such discretion, pace Washburn, pace even the Rome Statute. Moreover, this
issue is more than just a disagreement over treaty language; it implicates fundamental
principles of international law. A fuller explanation of my argument follows.
While X\ashburn faithfully and accurately transcribes multiple passages from the
Rome Statute governing the powers of its prosecutor,' nowhere does W\Xashburn
analyze the legal relationship between the treaty and the UN Charter, the highest
expression of international law, which explicitly takes precedence over all conflicting
treaties. 2 Especially important to tis analysis is Chapter VII, which reserves to the
Security Council in Article 39 the power to take actions to restore international peace
and security-the most compelling and central goal of our post-World War II
international legal order.3 These powers include, of course, military measures under
Article 42, but also non-mihtary measures under Article 41.4
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My position is that when the Security Council issues a directive in accordance
with its Chapter VII authority to restore international peace and security, these
directives carry the force of law and are in no way optional.' Indeed, when the
Securit, Council referred the Darfur case to the ICC prosecutor, it did so by
explicitly involing its Chapter VII authority and finding that an ICC investigation
was necessary for international peace and security. It is for this reason that I have
written elsewhere that such referrals transform the ICC from a criminal court into a
"security court," dedicated to fulfilling the Securitv Council goals of restoring peace
and security.6 In many ways, this is the defining feature of international criminal
justice: judging individual criminal liability because the fate of nations and peoples
depends on it. Wv hile iny interpretation is admittedy a vanguard one that departs
from the received wisdom of lawyers working at the new international court, it is
nonetheless more consistent with basic principles of international law and the
structure of UN institutions.
\Washbuin cites a number of Rome Statute provisions listing the discretion of
the ICC prosecutor. He also notes that i is "quite clear that the prosecutor would
not accept" my conclusion that the Security Council Chapter VII referral removed
his discretion. On this we can agree. I also concede that the drafters of the Statute
believed that the prosecutor could retain discretion in the face of Security Council
referrals. Nevertheless, paries to a multi-lateral treaty cannot, through a voluntary
treat coniitment, reserve for themselves powers that the UN Charter reserves
under Chapter VII for the Security Council. Thus, the parties of the Rome Statute
never had authority to grant discretion to the ICC prosecutor in the first place. The
failure of the prosecutor and the drafters to appreciate the Security Council's
authority under international law in no way means that they are right. Institutional
players always have an interest in believing that they have more discretion than the
law endows them with.
Of course, it is necessary to distinguish different kinds of discretion. When the
Security Council referred the Darfur case to the ICC prosecutor, the UN
Comnission of Inquiry for Darfur also handed him a sealed list of fifty-one persons
of interest. 7 It is certainly possible that there might be insufficient evidence to
prosecute a particular defendant. 8 If the defendant comnmitted no crime, he need
not-nor should not-be prosecuted. No one is suggesting that the prosecutor does
not have this level of discretion. XVhat I am suggesting is that the prosecutor does
not have discretion to determine whether he should commence an investigation.
Although this sounds obvious, this is precisely the level of discretion that the
prosecutor apparently believes he has.
Let us distinguish the Darfur case as a general in'estgatimn and the Darfur case as
against particular dl dant ". After the Security Council decided that an investigation
was necessary to restore peace and security, the prosecutor is required as a matter of
international law to conduct it, regardless of what the Rome Statute says.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor wrote in his letter to the Pre-Trial Chamber that his
office had conducted a review "to determine whether the criteria to initiate an
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investigation are satisfied." 9 \Vhile the prosecutor alone can determine the outcorie of
his investigation as against particular defendants, the decision to commence an
investigation is not his to make. In my view, the Security Council preempts this usual
process by making a binding referral under its Chapter VII authority.1 °
Of course, if the prosecutor were to conduct the investigation required by the
Securitv Council and decide that not a single individual should be brought to trial,
this would effectively collapse the distinction between the Darfur case as a general
matter and the Darfur case as a collection of individual prosecutions. \Vere the
prosecutor's reasons for deferring prosecutions unconvincing and insincere, the
Security Council might have something to say about this. It is particularly noteworthy
that the Rome Statute is ambiguous here. It purports to give the prosecutor
discretion to make these decisions with regard to the "interests of justice," 11
although it is unclear what this means. If the phrase "interests of justice" means the
culpability of individual defendants-a question that all crinnal prosecutors must
consider-then this discretion would not interfere with the Security Councils
authority to deal with matters of collective peace and security. If, however, the
"interests of justice" means something more collective 12 such as what is best for the
victims and aggressors as grops, then this, I submit, is precisely the kind of global
diplomatic concern that international law, and the UN Charter, reserves for the
Security Council.
The legal and political relationship between the Security Council and
adjudicatory bodies has always been a matter of legal controversy. 13 The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has, on occasion, sought to maintain its
independence from the Security Council. These issues arose in the N\i,4arqga,
Lokerbie, and Va//cases, and are well traveled in the legal literature. 14 There is a not-
so-subtle tug of war between the Security Council and the ICJ over allocation of
legal authority. The question of authority between the ICC prosecutor and the
Securit' Council is an instance of this same general institutional question.
One might be inclined to argue that the Security Council is ill-equipped to
handle quasi-adjudicative powers and that legal bodies such as the ICJ and the ICC
are more appropriate institutions to exercise legal discretion. But the Security
Council alreadv exercises several adjudicative functions allocated to it by the UN
Charter, and these functions are central to its mission to maintain international peace
and security.S' The structure of the UN Charter therefore makes clear that the
Security Council is, already, a quasi-adjudicative bod. Also, when situations involve
international peace and security, it is precisely the Security Council-not the ICC
prosecutor-that is endowed with the institutional resources to handle them.
One might also object that legal institutions created by the Security Council are
nonetheless independent from it, and by extension the ICC should be no less
independent even when cases are referred by the Council. For example, the ad hoc
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda were created by Securiv Council resolutions
under its Chapter VII powers, but decisions from these courts are not subject to
review by the Securitv Council.16 But this judicial independence can be distinguished
TI :ib I eadJ orna! of Dolpmrag and TIternatiol Reutois
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from our present discussion. In the case of the ICC, I maintain, the prosecutor
cannot exercise his own discretion about whether the interests of justice require an
investigation. Once the Securit, Council has decided that an investigation is
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, the prosecutor is,
in my view, constrained by international law to follow this ruling, and cannot decide
for himself whether an investigation is in "the interests of justice." This would be
like the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (JCTh)
deciding-for herself that international peace and security did not necessitate the
creation of ad hoc tribunals and, thus, closing up shop.
Of course, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic considered the Security
Council's authority under Chapter VII to create the ICTY in the first instance.1,
However, that was a special case where the court was required, through the very
demands of adjudication, to determine for itself whether it had jurisdiction to decide
the merits of the case-i.e. what the ICTY referred to as "la comptence de la
cmp e&nce." But the ICTY Appeals Chamber did not-nor could not-substitute its
own judgment about whether a tribunal was an appropriate response to the crisis in
Yugoslavia,18 just as I submit the ICC prosecutor cannot substitute his own judgment
about whether an ICC investigation is an appropriate response to the crisis in Darfur
or elsewhere.19
A deternmnation of this issue will have to wait until the ICC issues its first
decisions. However, this will not be the final word. I have no doubt that the ICC, as
a legal institution, will find greater discretion for itself and its prosecutor at the
expense of the Security Council. As a matter of institutional Rea politik, this should
not be surprising. The issue will most likely remain happily unresolved, unless the
Security Council is faced in the future with an ICC prosecutor who blatantly refuses
to act, "in the interests of justice," on a Chapter VII referral. Given that the ICC
prosecutor has, indeed, initiated an investigation of the Darfur situation, it is clear
that the time has not yet arrived.
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